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ABSTRACT

The proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 would bring U.S. patent law into harmony
with most other countries by adopting a first-to-file standard for determining patent
rights. This comment questions whether overturning the first-to-invent standard
and two hundred years of settled law is permissible under the Patent Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. The comment concludes that the Patent Reform Act of 2005, as
proposed, violates the Constitution, and supports its argument by placing into
context of the founding fathers fear of extending government monopolies. The
comment proposes that Congress focus on procedural reform, and not change the
fundamental standard for awarding patent rights.

Copyright © 2006 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Karen E. Simon, Comment, The PatentReform Act's Proposed
First-To-FileStandard: Needed Reform or ConstitutionalBlunder?,6
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 129 (2006).

THE PATENT REFORM ACT'S PROPOSED FIRST-To-FILE STANDARD: NEEDED
REFORM OR CONSTITUTIONAL BLUNDER?
KAREN
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SIMON*

Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in
literature, and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not
exceeding years, but for no longer term and for no otherpurpose.
Thomas Jefferson'

INTRODUCTION

The Patent Reform Act of 2005 ("PRA") proposes a radical change to the existing
standard for determining patent rights from first-to-invent to first-to-file. 2 Presently,
only the original inventor is entitled to patent protection, regardless of who is first to
apply for a patent.3 This allows a patent filed by someone who independently
4
originated an idea to be challenged by someone claiming priority of invention.
Under the proposed PRA, a party who is the first-to-file a patent application will be
recognized as the inventor. 5 The proposed PRA raises questions under the Patent
6
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and reverses two hundred years of settled law.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2007, The John Marshall Law School.
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1
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff07.txt.
2 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (2005) (eliminating the first-toinvent standard in lieu of the first-to-file standard in the United States). While this comment will
focus on the Patent Reform Act of 2005, it is important to note that the Patent Reform Act of 2006
was recently proposed in the Senate. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006).
Senate Bill 3818, also proposes the elimination of the first-to-invent standard in favor of the first-tofile standard. -d.
3A-10 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 10.01 (2004). Generally, the inventor
who first reduced the invention to practice has priority. -d. There are two exceptions to this rule.
Id. The first to conceive, but second to reduce to practice will prevail only if he exercised reasonable
diligence in reducing the invention to practice prior to the time the second person conceived the idea.
Id. Also, the first to reduce to practice will lose right to the invention if he abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed the invention. Id.
4 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 4 (2005) ("Section 15 of this Act introduced the
diligence concept by providing that an inventor's patent was invalid if it was for an invention
'invented or discovered by another, who was using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting
the same."').
5 See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries."). This Clause

is also known and referred to as the Patent Clause of the Constitution. Paul A. Ballonoff, Limits to
Regulation Due to Interaction of the Patent and Commerce Clauses, 20 CATO J. 401, 402 (2001),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ournal/cj20n3/j2On3-5.pdf. The battle between the first-to-
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While the first-to-invent standard for patentability has been in place in the
United States since the 1790s, it remains unique to the United States. 7 Indeed, the
first-to-invent standard has been subject to domestic and international criticism for
many years. 8 With increased globalization, the United States has received even
stronger pressure from other commercial nations to convert to a first-to-file standard,
because there are greater incentives to achieving harmonized global patent laws. 9
Multinational corporations and others involved in patent litigation also favor the
certainty that accompanies the first-to-file standard.10
Those who oppose the change to the first-to-file standard fear that, in practice,
small businesses, universities, research organizations, and individual inventors
would be unable to afford the expense of continuously filing applications.11
Consequently, the original inventor may lose patent protection to a subsequent
inventor who files first. The public may also suffer from a lack of adequate disclosure

file standard and first-to-invent standard is based on whether the term "Inventor," as used in the
Constitution, can mean something other than the first person to invent. Doug Harvey, Comment:
Reinventing the US. Patent System.*A Discussion of Patent Reform Through an Analysis of the
ProposedPatentReform Act of2005, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1133, 1144 (2006). A related question is
whether the definition of "Inventor" is mandated by the Constitution, or, alternatively, whether
Congress has the authority to define and redefine the term "Inventor"? Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Treaty Powerand the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United States'Ability to Harmonize ,
22 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2004). Over the past two hundred years, the courts have
awarded patent rights to the first inventor. See, e.g., Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 318-19 (1833).
7 CHISUM, supra note 4, § 4 ("The United States patent standard stands alone in the world in
determining priority among competing inventors by reference to who was the 'first to invent."').
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1829) (recognizing that while based on English common law,
it is still a distinct standard, although this does not mean that the founders were unaware of the
English law).
8 Kelber, Bi Has Issues All Will Debate, Scope and Complexity ofPatent Reform Act Reach
All Industry Sectors, 27 THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 50 (2005); see also Edwin A. Suominen, ReDiscoveringArticle I, § 8- A Uniquely American Formulafor a First-to-inventPatentStandard,66
FR 15409: Comment to Item 1, 1 (2001).
9 See, e.g., Edward G. Fiorito, The "Basic Proposal"for Harmonizationof US. and Worldwide
Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCIETY 83, 88-89 (1991)
(discussing the WIPO draft treaty harmonizing patent laws, which would require the United States
to adopt a first-to-file standard).
10 Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, Recent Development: The Rush to a First-to-Fie
Patent System in the United States: Is a Globally StandardizedPatent Reward System Really
Beneficial to Patent Quality and Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 757, 765
(2006). (noting that uncertainty and expenses are more of a concern for multinational corporations).
The first-to-file standard also eliminates three other rules that add uncertainty to the standard
including: "the 'secret prior' art rules governing commercial but nonpublic use, and that differ
depending on whether the user is the patentee or not; the 'experimental use' exemption based on a
totality of the circumstances analysis; and the perplexing definition of when an invention is on sale."
Patent Law Revision Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciay, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Mark A. Lemley, Professor, Stanford Law School).
I Lawrence B. Ebert, Patent Reform 2005: Sound and Fury Signifying What?, THE NEW
JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, July 18, 2005,
9-11 (recognizing that even large entities with limited
resources, such as a university, would suffer because they would be unable to make multiple filings
for each invention for each faculty member).
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resulting from the race to file the application first if the haste causes the application
12
to be incomplete and lacking necessary details.
This Comment analyzes Section 3 of the proposed PRA and the impact of
changing the United States patent law from the first-to-invent to the first-to-file
standard. After reviewing the major decisions in the two hundred years using the
first-to-invent standard, Section I considers the difficulties that have developed due
to increasing international global trade and its effect on United States policy.
Section II examines challenges to the first-to-file standard under the Patent Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress to grant patents for "Discoveries"
to "Inventors." 13 Section III proposes that it is better to maintain the fundamental
policy of encouraging invention by rewarding the inventor who is first-to-invent and
that Congress would be better advised to focus on making the current patent
procedures more efficient. This Comment concludes that the proposal in Section 3 of
the PRA is unconstitutional, and that a change in the constitutional standard will
disturb the Framers' preference for protecting against the abuses of government
granted monopolies.

I. BACKGROUND
A patent holder's right to a period of government-enforced exclusivity to use a
new invention is well established under English common law. 14 However, these
patent rights have their origin in the dishonored practice of the British Crown
rewarding favored subjects with monopolies in a variety of commercial areas, usually
in exchange for payments to the Monarch.1 5 Opposition to this corrupt practice
eventually led to its prohibition in the Statute of Monopolies of 1623.16 However, the
granting of patent rights to inventors was deemed to be a valuable incentive for
17
innovation and, as such, was exempted from this statute.

12

Cole A. Bloomberg, In Defense of the FirsttolInventRule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 260 (1993)

(recognizing that the public gains more from carefully prepared and full disclosures than it does
from a rushed inadequate application).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1' Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1829). English common law recognized various
monopolies until 1623 when the Statute of Monopolies was enacted and all monopolies where
abolished, except for the "exclusive privileges" of patents. Td. America differs from England in that
America never recognized monopolies, except for those in the form of patent rights. Id.
15 PJO Taylor, Spice of Life Letters Patent,THE STATESMAN (India), Jan. 16, 2005, available
at http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=3&id=94098&usrsess= 1.
The practice of
selling monopolies led to many abuses by the English Crown, and resulted in the entire country's
trade being controlled by relatively few men. Id. Examples of these abuses include: the granting of
exclusive rights to provide all Spanish wools to make felt hats and the exclusive right to print the
Psalms of David, including all the songs. Id.
16 Statute of Monopolies ch. 3 Eng. Preamble (1623) (noting that all monopolies are void).
17 Id. § 6 (recognizing that existing patents are not subject to this limitation). Under the
Statute of Monopolies, Parliament was authorized to grant inventors the exclusive right to their
invention for fourteen years. Id.
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The Framers of the U.S. Constitution strongly feared monopolies because of
their history of abuse by the British Crown.18 The Framers, however, also viewed
patents differently from other monopolies, and recognized that the protection of
patent rights is necessary with appropriate limitations. 19 Explaining the need for
patents in Federalist No. 43, James Madison stated
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason
to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both
cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately
make effectual provisions for either of the cases, and most of them
have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the
20
instance of Congress.
The right exists in the inventor, and is recognized through a government-issued
patent. 21 Madison apparently believed that if invention is necessary for progress in
society, then the inventor must be rewarded for his contribution as an incentive to
continue to innovate. 22 State-awarded monopolies, on the other hand, are not based
on any inherent individual right.2 3 Instead, a monopoly is a right created by the
government. 24 The award of a monopoly was not designed to promote innovation for
25
the public good, but rather to promote the private welfare of the monopolist.

18 Great A. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.,

340 U.S. 147, 154 (Douglas, J.

concurring). "The Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted." Id.
19Id.
20 The FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
21 See Ballonoff, supra note 6, at 402 (noting that the Framers, in not using the term "patent"

in the so-called "Patent Clause," declined to give the federal government the authority to grant
economic rights). Today, the general understanding of the term "patent" differs from its general
definition at the time the Constitution was written. Id. At the time the Constitution was drafted, a
'patent" was understood to be a grant of an economic right by the government. Id. The Framers of
the Constitution were aware of this general definition and intentionally did not include the word
'patent" in the Patent Clause. -d. at 401-02. Therefore, the Framers did not intend to authorize
Congress to grant economic rights. -d. at 402. Instead, in the Patent Clause, the Framers stated
the specific right that the government must protect. Id. at 403. This right, as Justice Story
recognized in his writings, is a "right to useful inventions ... [that] belongs to inventors." Id. at 406
(citing JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1147 (vol.

3) (Hilliard, Gray and Co. 1833)). "The right to useful inventions seems ... to belong to inventors;
and accordingly, it was saved out of the Statute of Monopolies in the reign of King James the First."

Id.
22 Soo The FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
23 Ballonoff, supra note 6, at 402-03. The present definition of a "monopoly" is the same as the

definition of a patent at the time the Constitution was drafted: economic rights granted by the
government. Id.
24 Id. at 402.
25 Id. (noting that the English Crown used to sell monopolies for its own benefit under the
pretense of being for the public good).
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Thomas Jefferson was not easily convinced that the benefits of protecting patent
rights outweighed the harm caused by monopolies. 26 However, he also came to
realize the distinction between patents and other monopolies, and eventually
supported the Patent Clause.2 7 Jefferson, like Madison, recognized that the interest
of the inventor and public good coincide, in that both benefit by rewarding the
28
inventor for his ingenuity.
The United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to distribute
patents. 29 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with
the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."3 0 In addition to giving Congress the right to issue
patents, the Patent Clause3 1 prescribes the Constitutional standard of
patentability.3 2 This Constitutional standard is specifically limited with respect to
recipient ("Inventors"), to subject matter ("Discoveries"), purpose ("promote the
33
Progress of Science"), and duration of rights granted ("for limited Times").

26
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff07.txt. Jefferson wrote to Madison from France arguing that "the
benefit of even limited monopolies is too doubtful, to be opposed to that of their general
suppression." Id. Jefferson opposed a Constitution that did not have a Bill of Rights, which would
include an express restriction against monopolies. Id.
27
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff07.txt.
Jefferson, in an 1807 letter, stated that "Certainly an
inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some certain time." Letter
from
Thomas
Jefferson
to
Oliver
Evans
(May
2,
1807),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeffll.txt. Jefferson, however, did not believe that there was inherit
property right belonging to an inventor, "It would be curious, then, if an idea, the fugitive
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable
property... . Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available athttp://www.constitution.org/tj/jeffl3.txt.
28 Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) with Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), available at http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff11.txt.
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588

(1952).
[T]hat "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States .... After granting many powers to the Congress, Article I goes on
to provide that Congress may "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof."

Id.
'30U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
'32 Graham,383 U.S. at 5-6.
33 Great A. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
The Congress does not have free rein ... to decide that patents should be easily or
freely given. The Congress acts under the restraint imposed by the statement of
purpose . . . "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ...." The means
for achievement of that end is the grant for a limited time to inventors of the
exclusive right to their inventions.
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Congress cannot exceed or vary this prescribed standard when enacting patent
34
legislation.
On April 10, 1790, Congress enacted the first laws governing patents.3 5 The
Patent Act of 1790 recognized that patent rights are vested in the individual that has
"invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or
any improvement therein not before known or used ... "36 Furthermore, the Act
recognized that a patent can be repealed if it is determined that the owner is not the
"first and true inventor or discoverer."37 Finally, the patent serves as "primafaci'e
evidence" that the patent holder is the first and true inventor of the patented
38
subject.
The administration of the Patent Act of 1790 was conducted by the Department
of State, but the power to grant patents was vested in three board members: the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General.3 9 The members
of the Patent Board soon realized that the Patent Act of 1790 failed to provide a
standard for resolving disputes that arose when more than one person claimed the
right to patent the same invention. 40 In one of the best known early patent cases,
four individuals applied for a patent on a steamboat. 41 A number of hearings were
held in April of 1791, where it was proposed that the Patent Board award a patent to
the first person to file an application. 42 This proposal was rejected. 43 The Patent
Board instead decided to grant all four patents, although for non-overlapping and
differing aspects of the steamboat. 44 John Fitch, who was most likely the original

Graham,383 U.S. at 5-6.
P.j. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 237, 237 (1936);
Patent Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10.
36 Patent Act of 1790 § 1, at 109-10.
37 Patent Act of 1790 § 5, at 111.
'38 Patent Act of 1790 § 6, at
11; see also Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 476 (D. Ohio 1855)
("[An] individual who disputes the right must produce evidence to counterbalance the legal
presumption of the right in the plaintiff from his patent.").
39 Federico, supra note 35, at 237-38. The first Patent Board members were Thomas
Jefferson, Henry Knox, and Edmund Randolph. Id. at 238. Thomas Jefferson played a large role in
shaping the patent standard in the United States. Id. The first board referred to themselves as the
"Commissioners for the Promotion of Useful Arts." Id. They were also known interchangeably as
the Patent Commission and the Patent Board. Id.
40 Id. at 248.
'3
3,

"

Id.

42 Id.

:'Id.
4 Id. at 248-50. Nathan Read and John Stevens were given specific patents for specific parts
that they had invented for the steamboat. Id. at 250. For instance, Read was awarded three
patents: first, for improvements on the boiler of the steam engine; second, for improvements of the
steam cylinder; and third, for the invention described as
[A] practical mode of driving or impelling boats or vessels of any kind in the water
or against the current, by means of chain-wheel, or rowing machine, constructed
and operating upon the general principles of the chain-pump, and moved by the
force of steam or any other power in the same manner the chain-pump is moved.
Id. at 249-50. There was no conflict between the patents granted. Id. at 250. Fitch's patent was
broad, covering several types of propelling, while Read's was limited to a particular manner of
propulsion. Id.
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inventor, was given a broad patent over the steamboat. 45 The Patent Act of 1793 not
only affirmed the first-to-invent standard, but also implemented what is known as an
"interference," which is the process for resolving priority disputes between alleged
46
inventors.
The Supreme Court found that the first-to-invent standard of awarding patent
rights is a proper exercise of the Congressional authority. 47 The Supreme Court has
continuously affirmed this first-to-invent standard since the Act was first passed in
1791.48 All subsequent Patent Acts continued to use the first-to-invent standard
49
without controversy.
The Patent Act of 1952 introduced the requirement that patents be nonobvious. 5 0
To qualify as non-obvious, the invention could not simply be an
improvement that is obvious to a "person having ordinary skill in the art.
... 51 This

45 Id.
Read and Stevens both admitted to the Patent Board that Fitch was the original
inventor of the steamboat. Id. However, Read and Stevens both felt that they still deserved the
exclusive rights the patent awards due to the improvements caused by their respective inventions.

d.
46 Patent Act of 1793, §§, 3, 9, 1 Stat. 318, 321, 322-23. When more than one application is
submitted for the same invention, the applications are submitted for arbitration, which consists of
three persons, one chosen by each party, and the last by the Secretary of State. Id. If more than two
parties exist, the Secretary of State appoints all three. Id. at 323.
47 Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 318-19 (1833). The policy behind granting exclusive
rights for new inventions in the United States was determined to be of such importance that
the power to do so was given to Congress through Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution. Id. at 318.
This power was exercised by congress, in the passage of [Patent] acts .... And from
an examination of their various provisions, it clearly appears, that it was the
intention of the legislature, by a compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest
the exclusive right in the inventor only ....
Id.at 318-19.
48 Se Seymour v. Osborn, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870) (reasoning that the role of patents is to
compensate "inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and reducing the
same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the
laws of Congress."); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1883)
(finding that a major difference between patent rights and copyrights are that patents cannot be
issued until the inventor can establish by proof "the novelty, the utility, and the actual discovery or
invention"); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 12 (1829) (reasoning that under the Constitution "the
right is created by the invention, and not by the patent"). Additionally, lower courts have continued
to follow this precedent. See Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 477 (D. Ohio 1855) (recognizing that
'[n]o exclusive right can be granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or discovered
and that the
....law gives him this right to compensate him for his effort); Thompson v. Haight, 23
F. Cas. 1040, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1826)
[The] "Essay on the Law of Patents .... " an American work, [states] that "there is
a difference between our statute and that of Great Britain on this subject. In
England, if the invention has been put in use before the patent is obtained, it is
void. But our act does not, like the English statute, refer to the grant of letters
patent, but to the time of the invention."
d. This is another difference between the United States standard and English standard, and again
points out that the focus is on the time of the invention. Id.
49 Se generallyPatentAct of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 (1836); Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
50 Patent Act of 1952 § 103, 66 Stat. 797 (1952).
51 Id.
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provision was challenged in Graham v. John Deere Co.52 The Graham Court agreed
that a patentability standard is contained in the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, but found that the non-obvious requirement is also included within this
standard.5 3 Therefore, the Patent Act of 1952 was found not to violate the
54
Constitution.
Importantly, in Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court reiterated that
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 is both a grant and a limitation on Congressional
power. 55 Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that in the United States,
"[innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must
'promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts."' 56 Therefore, Congress cannot impose
57
legislation that is contrary to the "inherent requisites" of the Constitution.
Undeniably, the first-to-invent standard has produced uncertainty. 58 Even
where a person independently creates an invention, and obtains a patent, which
recognizes his rights in that invention, the patent-holder still may lose those rights if
another proves to be the first creator.5 9 Moreover, there is significant complexity and
60
expense in judicially determining who is the first-to-invent.
Changing the standard to first-to-file would, arguably, simplify the process as
well as reduce legal cost for the inventor. 61 Proponents also claim that changing to
the first-to-file standard would improve fairness and enhance the progress toward a
globally harmonized patent standard. 62 It is argued that the first-to-invent standard

2

Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). In Graham, the Supreme Court considered

whether Congress acted within its authority when it added a third requirement, utility, to the
statutory test for granting patents. Id. The Court found that the 1952 Act merely codified the
traditional test of patentability. Id. at 3-4.
53 Id. at 5-6, 17.
54 Id. at 3-4 (holding that the 1952 Act codifies the traditional standard, and that even though
the Act emphasizes obviousness, "the general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability
remains the same.").
5 Id. at 5. The Supreme Court recognized that the intention of the limitation of Congressional
authority over patents was an effort to distinguish the United States from the English practice in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of granting monopolies. Id. The Constitution limited
Congress by only allowing patents to be awarded for inventions that promote the "useful arts." Id.
This Clause grants Congress the power to regulate the administration of distributing patents, but is
limited in regards to purpose, duration, patent holders, and inventions. Due to these constitutional
limitations, "Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed
by the stated Constitutional purpose." Id. at 5-6.
, Id. at 6.
57 Id.
58 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 10, at 765-66.
59 Dietz v. Wade, 7 F. Cas. 684, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1859) ("He who invents first shall have the prior
right if he is using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the same, although the second
inventor first perfects and reduces the same to practice in a positive form.").
60
Steven Ludwig, US. Patent Reform and the Future of Nanoteehnology, 20 LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER 37, 24 (2005).
61 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 10,
1 (noting the current system needs to simplify the
unnecessary complex rules); see also Kelber, supra note 8,
4 (noting that there is currently
surprisingly little opposition to changing the patent standard to first-to-file and recognizing that the
change will simplify the process).
G(2 Lemley, supra note 10,
10.
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requires complex proof of invention, which some say creates an unfair advantage to
63
those who can afford the costs.
The first-to-file standard, on the other hand, may lead to incomplete patent
applications due to the pressure to file first. 64 When comparing patent applications
from the United States and Japan, many Japanese applications are considered
inadequate, as a result of rushing to obtain the priority date. 65 Consequently, United
States applications are much more developed. 66 Those supporting the first-to-invent
standard argue that the public gains more from a patent containing complete
disclosure of a finished invention than it does from an incomplete disclosure of a
67
newly developed idea.
In 1966, the President's Commission on the Patent System recommended that
68
the United States depart from precedent and adopt a first-to-file standard.
Congress rejected the recommendation after industry and Bar Associations spoke out
against it.69 In the mid 1980s, the United Nations' World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") proposed that member countries, including the United States,
adopt a first-to-file standard. 70 At that time, United States leadership assured the G7 nations that the United States would be a first-to-file country before the end of the
decade. 71 Those supporting the change tended to be multinational corporations who
preferred the certainty and had the funds to file patent applications quickly and
continuously.72

Professional inventors, universities, and small businesses continued to defend
the first-to-invent standard.73 In 1990, international pressures continued as WIPO
drafted a treaty, which would impose a first-to-file standard on all signatories.7 4 Like
previous attempts to change the U.S. patent standard, it was opposed and the treaty
75
was never adopted.
While the United States did not implement the change before the end of the last
century, Congress is now taking steps to enact sweeping reforms to U.S. patent
63 Id.
11 (expressing that while in the past, small inventors have criticized the first-to-file
standard, new evidence shows that it is large corporations who benefit most from the first-to-invent
standard).
64 Gabriel Katona, First-to-File- Not in the United States, 73 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 399, 401

(1991).
65
Charles R.B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File."Is American Adoption of the International
Standardin PatentLaw Worth the Prie2? 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 543, 573 (1988).
66 Katona, supra note 64, at 400.
67 Bloomberg, supra note 12, at 260.
68 Suominen, supra note 8, at 1.
(39 Id.
70 Fiorito, supra note 9, at 84, 88. The United States is the last major country to use the firstto-invent standard. CHISUM, supra note 4, § 4. This has created problems for the harmonization of
international patent laws, which has become important in an increasingly commercially
interdependent world. Fiorito, supra note 9, at 84, 88.
71 Kelber, supra note 8,
3. The promise was made by United States trade representatives
without "advance consultation with patent professionals." Katona, supra note 64, at 400.
72 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 9, 765-66.
7 Id.
74 Fiorito, supra note 9, at 84-85, 88.
75 Suominen, supra note 8, at 1. In 2001, WIPO proposed another harmonization treaty Id.
As in 1990, this treaty would require that all signatories adopt a first-to-file standard for solving
patent disputes. Id.
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laws. 76 On June 8, 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives' Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property introduced H.R.
2795, The Patent Reform Act of 2005. 77

Among the many proposed reforms, H.R.

76 See generally The Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). The
Patent Reform Act of 2005 has several provisions including changing the first-to-invent standard to
first-to-file standard for resolving patent disputes. Ebert, supra note 11, 2. It also would allow
someone other than the inventor to file an application. It would place duty of candor and
inequitable conduct inquiries under the PTO's jurisdiction and create duty of candor for parties
opposing patent or application. Kelber, supra note 8, 11. H.R. 2795 would also change provisions
on reasonable royalty and willful infringements. Id. at
18-21. A losing party would also be
allowed to obtain a stay of an injunction pending an appeal. Id. T 15. The PTO Director will be able
to limit circumstances under which priority can be claimed for a continuation. Id. T 7. Finally, it
would change post-grant activities to include publication application, as well as the creation of a
post-grant opposition procedure. Id.
77 The Patent Reform Act, 2005 H.R. 2795 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). In 2005, the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee created a new subcommittee to handle intellectual property issues. Ludwig,
supra note 60, 2. The goals of the Patent Reform Act are to allay concerns about the quality of
patents, curb patent litigation abuse and take steps toward global harmonization. Pedersen &
Braginsky, supra note 10, at 757. Both the Senate and House Committees want to create strong
patent protection as an incentive for invention. Ludwig, supra note 60, 7 1-2. Multiple House and
Senate hearings have been held to address these issues, which have attracted many organizations,
industry groups, companies, and individual inventors, including the Intellectual Property Owners
Association, Business Software Alliance, Financial Services Roundtable, American Bar Association,
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the U.S Patent and Trademark Office, National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Genentech, Eli Lilly, Intel, Micron
Technologies, and Intellectual Ventures. Id. T 5. Because the patent system works differently in
different industries, it will be difficult to obtain complete agreement. Lemley, supra note 10, 7 5-6.
The people in favor of the change say that it simplifies the complex rules for determining the first
inventor. Id. 9. Also, it is argued that the elimination of inferences will help small business and
those with fewer resources. Id. 11. Inferences are costly, therefore, large inventors challenge the
patents of small inventors more frequently. Id. Also, H.R. 2795 has a marked distinction from a
typical first-to-file standard. Id.
12. H.R. 2795 allows inventors or discoverers "who sell, use, or
publish their invention [within one] year to get a patent application on file." Id. Therefore, those
with fewer resources who are concerned about losing a race to the patent office can still publish their
invention on a website. Id. This will help protect the inventor from someone else getting a patent,
and allow the inventor time hire a patent attorney and file an application. Id. One speaker at the
hearings said that the first-to-file standard in "the rest of the world is a disadvantage to universities

and independent inventors." The Patent Act of 2005 Hearing of the Courts the Internet, and
Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. 27. (2005)
(testimony of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation).
This speaker quoted ProTon, the pan European network of knowledge transfer offices, which
expressed its belief of the weakness of the European patent standard. Id. 7 27-28. ProTon stated,
The patent system in Europe, with its complexity and cost, is much less
appropriate to university-based inventions than the U.S. standard and acts as a
barrier to innovation from public research. It lacks a grace period, a provisional
patent standard, a continuation-in-part (CIP) system and is several times more
expensive. ProTon Europe is convinced that these differences account in large
part for the much lower number of patent inventions coming out of public
research in Europe.
Id. 28. The speaker went on to say that the uniquely American standard gives an advantage to
universities and is relied on by the universities. Id. Thus, he argued that the first-to-invent
standard should remain. Id. T 29.
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2795 would finally change the United States by creating a first-to-file standard,
78
consistent with the rest of the world.

II. ANALYSIS
House Bill 2795, Section 3 would change over two hundred years of settled law
by implementing a first-to-file standard. 79 In effect, Congress would be redefining
the term "Inventors" as used in the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as those
who first file an application in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO").80 The constitutionality of such a change will be examined in this section.
Part A of this section analyzes the text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and what
the Framers intended it to mean.81 Part B studies the historical interpretation and
application of the Patent Clause in the United States. After examining other
considerations that might justify a reinterpretation of the Patent Clause, Part C
concludes that the first-to-file standard as proposed in H.R. 2795 is unconstitutional.

A.

The Meaning of the Text

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 specifically authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 82 The
Congressional authority to regulate patents stems from this specific Constitutional
provision, which is both a grant and a limitation of power. 83 This Clause grants
Congress the power to regulate the administration of patent distribution, but limits
Congress's power in regards to purpose, duration, patent holders, and inventions.
Due to these Constitutional limitations, "Congress in the exercise of the patent power

8 4

may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated Constitutional purpose."

78 2005 H.R. 2795 § 3 (striking the language "at the time the invention was made" and
inserting "before the effective filing date of the claimed invention," this section also eliminates
interferences as they are no longer necessary in a first-to-file standard).
79 See generallyPatent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
80 Holbrook, supra note 6. The issue of whether or not Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 authorizes
Congress to define and redefine the term "Inventors" in the Patent Clause is at the center of the
debate over the constitutionality of the first-to-file standard. Id. The PRA attempts to redefine
"Inventor" by granting the patent right to the individual who files the application first. See Patent
Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
81 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. While Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 also refers to the rights of
Authors for their writings, this comment only focuses on inventors and their discoveries. Although
"Authors and Inventors" is used in the same constitutional clause, and deals with the same
principles, "Authors and Inventors" are treated as separate and distinct. Burrow-Giles Lithograph
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884). Congress, giving effect to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 divided
the persons who are to be benefited into two separate categories: authors and inventors. Id.
Authors are given a monopoly right called a copyright, while inventors are given a patent right. Id.
83 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1965).
81 Id. at 5-6. Congress also may not "enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby." Id. at 6.
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Unlike many enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, Congress's power is explicitly
85
qualified, making the Patent Clause unique.
Because Congress is authorized to act only pursuant to the power it is given in
the Constitution, the adoption of the first-to-file standard is only possible if the
Patent Clause allows patent rights to be vested in someone other than the first
inventor. The Constitutional limitations provided in the Patent Clause secure
exclusive rights only to "Inventors" for their "Discoveries." 86 At the time the
Constitution was written, an inventor was defined as "one who produces something
new; a devisor of something not known before."87 In 1787, "to discover" was defined
as "to bring to light," "to find out" or "to make known."88 These words have the same
meaning today,8 9 and on their face, still appear to refer to the first discovery.
However, for the PRA to be constitutional, Congress must be able to define
"Inventors" in the Patent Clause.90 Therefore, it is necessary to examine the
historical context of the term "Inventor" to ascertain the Framers' intent. There was
no recorded debate at the Constitutional Convention about the definition of the terms
"Inventors" and "Discoveries." 91 In Federalist No. 43, James Madison refers to
"Inventors" as individuals and to the right of invention as a personal right that can
be claimed only by an inventor: "The copyright of authors has been solemnly
adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful
92
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors."
85 Great A. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 168 (1950) (Douglas, J.,

concurring); Figuera v. U.S., 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 149 (2005) ("The Intellectual Property Clause is unique
in that it is the only one of the Enumerated Powers where the drafters mandated 'aspecific mode of
accomplishing the particular authority granted,' i.e.,
'by securing exclusive rights for limited times
to authors and inventors in their respective writings and discoveries."').
86 Soe U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
87 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, vol. 1 (1787); THE MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, 5th ed., 222 (1997) (listing a relatively unchanged definition today). The
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term "invent" as "to think up" and alternatively "to create
or produce for the first time." Id.
88 JOHNSON, supra note 87. An alternative definition at the time was "to make known; not to
disguise; to reveal." Id. While this definition could give rise to the argument that "discoveries" is a
term the Framers intended to use to cover the act of disclosure, examining the context of the Clause
and the historical interpretation of the Clause, "discoveries" has been established to mean the
activity of the inventor. See A.H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standa-rd of Patentability,48 J.
PAT. OFF. SOCY 1, 15.
89 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 5th ed., 222 (1997). The modern definition of "to discover"
is "to obtain sight or knowledge of for the first time" or "to make known or visible." Id.
90 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 6.
If the language in the [Patent] clause means "the inventor," and not "an inventor,"
then the exclusive rights must be awarded to the first to invent. Consequently,
Congress would not have the power under the Constitution to change the patent
law to redefine the term "inventor" to mean the first to file a patent application.

Id.
91 Edward Walterscheid, PriorityofInvention: How the United States Came to Have a Firstto-Invent PatentStandard 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 281 (1995).
92 THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). It is not necessary to agree with Madison that
the right of invention is a "natural right" to understand the implications of Madison's view. See
supra text accompanying note 27. If the inventor had a right recognized at common law, the use of
"Inventors" in the Patent Clause would seem to point to a person rather than a concept open to
interpretation by Congress.
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Early English practices give little insight into the meaning of the term
"Inventors," or "Priority of Invention." 93 Proponents of the first-to-file standard argue
that the Framers could not have intended patent rights exclusively for the original
inventor, because English common law extended patent rights to the "first
importer." 94 Despite the common law interpretation, the United States rejected this
idea in 1790, after proposed legislation failed due to concerns that it conflicted with
95
the Constitutional standard in the Patent Clause.
Proponents of implementing the first-to-file standard in the United States also
may argue that the purpose of the Patent Clause would be better served by the firstto-file standard. 96 The Patent Clause is different from the other enumerated powers
of the Constitution. 97 The language stating that Congress has the authority "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . ." arguably is a preamble, setting
forth the purpose of the Patent Clause. 98 Arguably, the first-to-file standard is a
better way to achieve this objective. 99
While Congress generally may choose the best ways to implement a
Constitutional provision, Congress cannot exceed the limits of its granted
authority. 100 Unlike the other enumerated powers, the Framers listed specific

9 Walterseheid, supra note 91, at 266-67. While the exact number of patent cases in England
prior to 1790 is unknown, of the sixteen recorded cases, none dealt with priority of invention. Id. at
267 n. 10. Instead, when there was debate over a patent, the most likely result was that neither
party would receive the patent on the grounds that it was not new. Id. at 268.
9 Id. at 266-67. England, until the middle of the nineteenth century, granted patents as long
as the invention was new to England, regardless if it was known in other parts of the world. Id.
This practice was known as granting patents to the "first importer," who was not necessarily the
innovator. Id.
9 Id. at 282. In 1790 the House committee drafted H.R. 41, which eventually became the
Patent Act of 1790. Id. H.R. 41 specifically authorized patents to be granted to the first importer.
Id. Debate on the bill led to the removal of this section due to concerns that patents of importation
were beyond the Constitutional authority of Congress. Id. Representative Thomas Fitzsimmons
wrote "The 6th Section, allowing Importers, was left out, the Constitutional power being
Questionable." Id. Madison had also argued "that patents of importation were unconstitutional."
Id. Therefore, while English Common law recognized the rights of the first importer, this idea was
never part of the American patent standard due to concerns over constitutional validity. Id.
96 See generallyWalterscheid,supranote 91.
97 Soe Great A. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 168 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (noting that the
Patent Clause is both a grant and a limitation of power); Figuera v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139,
149 (2005) (recognizing that the Patent Clause is unique in that it is the only Clause where the
Framers directed a specific mode for accomplishing its stated purpose).
98 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8; see Figuera,66 Fed. Cl. at 149.
99 Peter A. Jackman, Essay Adoption of a First-To-File Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U.
BALT. L. REV. 67, 86 (1997).
,00 Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course,
implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its
judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the
grant to Congress of any Article I power. Within the scope established by the
Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability.
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provisions for the implementation of the Patent Clause's purpose.10 1 The stated
requirements for granting an exclusive right were most likely established due to the
Framers' fear of monopolies 0l1 2 Even if the first-to-file standard is the best way to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," in today's global society, the
Constitutional commands cannot be ignored.103 Therefore, proponents of the first-tofile standard still must satisfy the specific requirements expressed in the Patent
Clause.
However, the Framers clearly believed that in order to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," there must be an incentive for inventors to continue their
work.10 4 Therefore, one of the main purposes behind the Patent Clause is to give
inventors "the exclusive use of the thing invented or discovered, for a few years, as a
compensation for 'his ingenuity, labor, and expense in producing it."'10 5 The first-tofile standard does not necessarily compensate the original inventor, but the person
who files the application first. Accordingly, there is not security in being the first
inventor.
Proponents of the first-to-file standard may also argue that Congress has the
authority to implement the first-to-file standard through its other expressed
Constitutional powers.10 6 Congress also has authority to pass patent legislation
through its Commerce Clause power or its power to approve treaties.10 7 Therefore,
supporters of the first-to-file standard may argue that the standard is constitutional
108
under these provisions.
However, Congress's general grant of power under other Constitutional
provisions is not enough to implement a standard that would ignore the specifically
defined limitations of the Patent Clause.10 9 While Congress may be constitutionally
101 Figuera v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 149 (2005). "[T]he drafters mandated 'a specific
mode of accomplishing the particular authority granted [in the Patent Clause],' i.e., 'by securing
exclusive rights for limited times to authors and inventors in their respective writings and
discoveries."' Id.
102 Graham, 383 U.S. at 7.
10:3 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, el. 8; Graham,383 U.S. at 6.
104 Graham, 383 U.S. at 8 (citing Writings of Thomas Jefferson, (vol. 5) at 47 (Ford ed., 1895)).
Jefferson, in an 1807 letter, stated that "Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the
benefit of his invention for some certain time .. " Id.
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220 (1953).
105 Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 477 (D. Ohio 1855).
106
See generally Holbrook, supra note 6 (discussing patent harmonization and the
relationship of the Patent Clause to other constitutional provisions).
107 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."); U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur.").
108 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST., art. H, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
109 Miller v. Pasco, 310 P.2d 863, 866 (Wash. 1957). "[E]ach and every section of a legislative
enactment must be given meaning, and ...where general powers are granted with specific powers
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authorized to act under other provisions to enact a multi-national patent standard,
the standard created still must be in accordance with the other Constitutional
provisions. 110 If the first-to-file standard exceeds the Constitutional requirements in
the Patent Clause, such legislation could not be a proper exercise of authority under
any other general Constitutional provision, either.1 11
A plain reading of the Patent Clause indicates that an exclusive right to an
invention can only be granted to the original inventor, not to the person who wins the
race to the patent office. The use of the words "Inventors" and "Discoveries" seems to
convey rather clearly that the Framers intended the Clause to refer to the first or
original inventor as opposed to anyone who later develops the same invention
independently. This is supported by the lack of debate from the Constitutional
Convention,1 1 2 the refusal to allow the first importer to obtain patent rights, 113 and
114
the goal of encouraging invention by compensating the inventor.
The plain meaning interpretation is also consistent with the use of the word
"securing" when describing the "exclusive right" of a patent. In Federalist 43,
Madison drew an explicit correlation between the property right of the inventor and
the public good. 115 Indeed, redefining the "Inventors" to be the people anointed by
the act of a government filing disregards the Framers' concern that government
11 6
patent monopolies should be strictly limited.

B. Two Hundred Years of Settled Law
Congress has instituted patent legislation through various Patent Acts.1 1 7 There
have been various issues litigated in response to this legislation.11 8 In dealing with
enumerated, the general powers are modified, limited, and restricted to the extent of the specific
enumeration." Id.
10 See Id. "[T]he general grant of power must yield in its scope to the specific powers
enumerated." Id.
I S Id.
112 Walterscheid, supra note 91, at 281. "It is unfortunate that no delegate left any record as
to what the Convention intended 'inventors' and 'discoveries' to mean." Id.
113 Id. at 282 (rejecting first importer, even though it was the practice in England at the time,
due to Constitutional concerns).
11 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). The Court noted that the patent right was
designed as a "reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge." Id.
115 THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) ("The public good fully coincides in both cases
with the claims of individuals.").
116 See Ballonoff, supra note 6, at 402 (recognizing that the Framers intentionally left out the

word "patent" from the Patent Clause because at that time it was understood to mean a grant of an
economic right by the government).
117 Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109; Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318; Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat.
117; Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198; Patent Act of 1874, 18 Stat. 78; Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat.
797.
118 Chisum, supra note 4.
Landmarks [court decisions] included Mergenthaler v. Scuder, [11 App. D.C. 264]
(1897), defining conception; Mason v. Hepburn, [13 App. D.C. 86] (1898), holding
that a first inventor loses priority by abandoning, suppressing or concealing the
invention after reduction to practice; Automatic Weighing Machine v. Pneumatic
Scale Corp. [166 F. 288 (1st Cir.] 1909), holding that the filing of a patent
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patent disputes, the Supreme Court has not only looked at what qualifies as an
invention, but also who qualifies as an inventor. 119
The early Patent Acts required elements of novelty and utility before an
invention could be patented. 120 The Patent Act of 1952 added a third element: nonobviousness. 121 In considering a challenge to Congress's authority to add this
requirement, the Supreme Court found that the non-obvious requirement did not
expand the Constitutional standard, but merely codified it.122 The Court has found
that "innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must
'promote the Progress of ...useful Arts.' This is the standard expressed in the
Constitution and it may not be ignored." 123 The Court has warned against attempts
1 24
to broaden the definition of patents beyond the Constitutional limitations.
While the first-to-file standard does not seek to change the requirements for
invention, it does attempt to change the person who has the rights to the
invention.125 Courts have consistently held that exclusive rights are granted to the
original inventor.1 26 Just as some individuals have over the years attempted to
expand what qualifies as an invention, some have also tried to expand the definition
127
of an inventor.
Those in favor of the first-to-file standard would argue that this standard does
not expand the meaning of the term "Inventors." 128 Instead, they argue that modern
practicalities often result in two people developing the same invention
independently.1 29 In these cases, it could be argued, both are inventors who spent
time and resources developing their idea. Therefore, the adoption of the first-to-file

specification adequately disclosing the invention is constructive reduction to
practice; and Sydeman v. Thomas, [32 App. D.C. 362] (1909) summarizing a long
series of decisions on what constitutes an actual reduction to practice.

Id.
11) Soo, e.g., Dietz v. Wade, 7 F. Cas. 684, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1859) (noting that the person who
invents first is the inventor as long as he uses reasonable diligence to reduce it to practice). This is
true regardless of whether a second person reduces the same to practice first. Id.
120 Patent Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 109; Patent Act of 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318; Patent Act of
1836, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 118; Patent Act of 1870, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
121 Patent Act of 1952, § 103, 66 Stat. 797, 798.
122 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
123 Id. at 6.
124 E.g., Great A. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 169-70 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, criticized attempts to depart from the
Constitutional standard for patents. Id.
125 See Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3.
12
Seeo, e.g., Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 477 (D. Ohio 1855). "No exclusive right can be
granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or discovered." Id. "And the law gives
[the inventor] the exclusive use of the thing invented or discovered, for a few years, as a
compensation for 'his ingenuity, labor, and expense in producing it."' Id. "To sustain his patent, the
plaintiff must show that he was the first and original inventor or discoverer." Id. at 479.
127 Soo Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (proposing a first-to-file
standard). See also Suominen, supra note 8, at 1 (discussing various attempts to change the United
States to a first-to-file standard).
128 Walterscheid, supra note 91, at 281.
129 Jackman, supra note 99.
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standard would create a simple way for solving these disputes because the patent
130
would be granted to the individual with the earliest patent filing date.
While this has a certain practical appeal, it runs contrary to the past two
hundred years of interpretation and application of the Patent Clause. Until the PRA,
the Patent Acts have continued to reject the first-to-file standard, and the courts
have consistently held that awarding patent rights to the original inventor is in
accordance with the Constitution.1 31 Therefore, interpretation and application have
always understood the term "inventor" to mean the first person to invent.

C CurrentPolicy
In addition to considering the meaning of the Constitutional text and its
subsequent interpretations through legislation and case law, it is also necessary to
consider current policy in regard to the patent dispute resolution. Practical
considerations exist both in favor of and against adopting a first-to-file standard in
the United States. Debates regarding the first-to-file standard often focus only on
the practical issues.
Proponents of the first-to-file standard mainly stress the need for international
patent harmonization.1 32 The first-to-invent standard currently in place affects the
United States both politically and economically.1 33 The United States is often unable
to join in international treaties due to its failure to implement a first-to-file
standard.1 34 Arguably, this also prevents the United States from effectively
competing in the international patent market.
Additionally, proponents of the first-to-file standard argue that individual
inventors with fewer resources will benefit. 13 5 It is argued that interferences, the
legal mechanism for determining patent rights during a dispute, usually result in a
loss for the independent inventor against the inventor with large funds due to the
1 37
cost of the procedure.1 36 Interferences are not necessary in a first-to-file standard.

1:30 Kelber, supra note 8, at S 1-2.

Patent Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10; Patent Act of 1793, §§ 3, 9, 1 Stat. 318, 321,
322-23; Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117; Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198; Patent Act of 1874, 18 Stat.
78; Patent Act of 1952, § 103, 66 Stat. 797. See, e.g., Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 318-19 (1833)
(noting that the legislature, through the various Patent Acts, intended to vest the exclusive patent
131

right in the inventor only); Stamicarbon v. Sepracor, Inc., No. 97-8, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9061, at
*17, *24 (D. Delaware March 12, 2001) (continuing to uphold the patent dispute resolution standard
awarding the patent to the first inventor, not the first-to-file).
132 Pedersen, supra note 10, at 764-65. Implementing a first-to-file standard in the United
States, bringing the United States in line with Europe and Japan is important as part of the plan to
create an international treaty, which would create mutual reciprocity for patents granted in any of
these countries. Td. This would lead to not only recognition of the patents granted by different
countries, but also would encourage enforcement of foreign patents within each country. Id.
1:3:3See, e.g., Fiorito, supra note 9, at 83, 88-89.
1:34 Id
135 Ebert, supra note 11,
9; Pedersen, supra note 10, at 765-66.
1:36Ebert, supra note 11,
9.
137 Ludwig, supra note 60,
26.
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Therefore, the first-to-file standard for patent dispute resolution provides individual
13 8
inventors security without the cost of expensive litigation.
While there are mainly historical reasons for not adopting the first-to-file
standard, there are also practical considerations. For instance, while small entities
or individual inventors may worry about the cost associated with interferences, they
139
would replace that cost with the expense of rushing to file an application.
Additionally, they will encounter the expense of continuously filing applications as
the invention develops.1 40 With continuous filing the inventor not only risks not
having the funds to file updated applications, but also jeopardizes efforts to attract
new sponsors and researchers. 141 Also, examination costs and workload will increase
at the PTO.1 42 If there is a rush to file applications, the quality of the applications
will decrease, which will increase the cost of examination. 143
These practical
considerations must be considered before implementing the first-to-file standard.

III. PROPOSAL
Given the constitutional uncertainty, Congressional alternatives are either to
amend the Patent Clause, or reject the first-to-file standard, and look to alternative
methods of patent reform. 144 Amending Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution is
138

-d.;

1:39Id.

Ebert, supra note 11,

25.

9; Lemley, supra note 10,

10.

140 Id. In addition to the cost of filing more applications, the amount of pressure to file at the
earliest possible point will also increase. Steve Seidenberg, A Sea Change in PatentLaw.*Proposed
Legislation Would Wean the United States From a First to InventApproval System, 92 A.B.A. J.
49,
78 (2006). This added pressure and cost will have the greatest impact on individual inventors
and small companies because larger companies already act as though the United States has a firstto-file standard, because that is how these companies are also filing applications in the rest of the
world. Id.
78. Therefore, multi-national corporations are better prepared for a first-to-file
standard because that is how they receive priority in foreign countries. Id.
"I Ludwig, supra note 60, 25.
142 Katona, supranote 64, at 402 ("[T]he hurried filing of erroneous and incomplete disclosures
will increase the proportion of examining time required for adequacy of disclosure issues, thereby,
requiring more total examining time per application if the same quality of examination on the
merits is to be maintained.").
14:3 Id

144 See Federico, supra note 35, at 248 (noting that the original Patent Board rejected the firstto-file standard in favor of the first-to-invent standard); see also Walterscheid, supra note 91, at 281
(noting that Congress in 1790 rejected the first importer provision due to concerns that such
legislation was beyond the Constitutional authority of Congress); Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 477
(D. Ohio 1855) (recognizing that "no exclusive right can be granted for anything which the patentee
has not invented or discovered" and that the law gives him this right to compensate him for his
effort).
The court has also rejected attempts to broaden the scope of the Patent Clause by
disregarding its limitations. Great A. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147,
168 (1950) (Douglas. J. concurring).
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception of patents than
the Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The Patent Office, like most
administrative agencies, has looked with favor on the opportunity which the
exercise of discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has placed a
host of gadgets under the armour of patents -- gadgets that obviously have had no
place in the constitutional scheme of advancing scientific knowledge.
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both difficult and not necessarily beneficial to patent reform. 145 Congress should
focus instead on reforming patent procedures implementing the first-to-invent
standard.
When weighing the modern practical considerations against the historical
foundation upon which the first-to-invent standard is based, it becomes evident that
a Constitutional amendment would be unwise. 146 The first-to-invent standard is a
uniquely American standard that has been in place for over two hundred years, and
has proven itself to work. 147
The Framers were strongly opposed to monopolies and other abuses by the
crown, and sought to prevent such abuses in the Constitution. 148 The Framers
sought to prevent the federal government from gaining too much control by expressly
limiting its powers. In the case of patents, the courts have upheld these limitations
and have found that the right to patent exclusivity rests with the original inventor
only. 149 To change the Constitutional standard at this point would result in patent
Id. at 169.
H5L See U.S. CONST., art. V. In order to bypass Constitutional provisions, the Constitution sets
forth an amendment process. Id. Therefore, if Congress chooses to switch to the first-to-file
standard, it can be added through a Constitutional amendment. Id. However, Congress cannot skip
this process and implement legislation that is beyond its authority.
116 Compare Lemley, supranote 10, at 3.
[F]irst inventor to file recognizes the international nature of today's
markets ...Because the rest of the world already uses filing rather than
invention date to measure priority, first inventor to file will take an important
step towards global harmonization, permitting U.S. inventors to more easily seek
patent protection not just in the U.S. but [also] in other countries.
Id. with Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 318-19 (1833) (finding that the Constitution authorized
Congress to promote the useful arts by granting exclusive rights to the original inventor only), and
Allen v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 477 (D. Ohio 1855) (recognizing that "no exclusive right can be
granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or discovered" and that the law gives him
this right to compensate him for his effort).
147 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1829)
(recognizing that while based on English
common law, the United States patent standard is unique). While the first-to-invent standard is
unique to America, so is the underlying philosophy upon which America is based. Compare U.S.
CONST., with 1-2 Doing Business in France § 2.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005) and 1-1 Doing
Business in the United Kingdom § 1.04 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005). The philosophy of the United
States' trading partners is often based on a belief in the government and its efficiency. E.g., 1-2
Doing Business in France § 2.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005). French law is based primarily on
statutory law, not common law. Id. The French government creates and updates the laws. Id.
Accordingly, France does not depend on common law rights, but only government created rights.
The rights in other countries exist because the government gave the people those rights. E.g., 1-1
Doing Business in the United Kingdom § 1.04 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005). Because there is no
written British Constitution, no law is above any other law. Id. There is no Bill of Rights or other
documenting protecting any individual rights. Id. Therefore, it is the government that defines and
protects the people's rights. Id.
148
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff07.txt ("The benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be
opposed to that of their general suppression.").
1'9 See Stamicarbon v. Sepracor, Inc., No. 97-8, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9061, *17, *24 (D.
Delaware March 12, 2001) (continuing to uphold the patent dispute resolution standard awarding
the patent to the first inventor, not the first-to-file); Seymour v. Osborn, 78 U.S. 516, 533-34 (1870)
(reasoning that the role of patents are to compensate "inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in
making the inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by
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rights running with the invention, not the inventor. If the incentives for an inventor
are not adequately protected, then society will not receive the intended benefits.
Madison and Jefferson knew that the Patent Clause is based upon this fundamental
principle.150
Changing the Constitutional limitations in the Patent Clause could result in the
abuses the Framers intended to prevent. 151 While it seems straightforward to talk
about "filing," the practical application of this term could involve great subjectivity.
The issue of what constitutes a "filing," (the forms, place, time, discretion of patent
office personnel, and other issues typically raised by government regulation and
enforcement), could lead to the type of uncertainty that first-to-file proponents seek
to avoid.
More fundamentally, adopting a government filing as the ultimate standard of
awarding patent rights amounts to a fundamental shifting in the limitations of the
Patent Clause. Framers feared monopolies and other exercises of government power,
and carefully restricted Congressional authority to grant patent rights to individuals
who could demonstrate an action completely independent of the government; the first
creation of a literary work or invention. 152 The implementation of a first-to-file
standard alters the basis for receiving a patent monopoly to an event involving the
government, the consequences of which cannot be fully understood.
If Congress wants to reform the patent process, it should look to better
implementation of the current standard, and not depart from the Framers' intention
and current Constitutional requirements. Improving the efficiency and certainty in
the patent process might take three initial steps. First, require transparency in the
standard. Currently, most patent applications are published within eighteen months
of filing.153
However, the publication excludes patents that are filed only
domestically. 154 This broad exception prevents the United States from achieving its
intended goals of preventing duplicate research and warning inventors of possible
conflicts. 155

the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws of Congress"); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 318-19
(1833) (noting that the legislature, through the various Patent Acts, intended to vest the exclusive
patent right in the inventor only).
150 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 8 (citing V Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 47 (Ford ed., 1895).
151
JOAN THIRSK, ECONOMIC POLICY AND PROJECTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER
SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 34 (Clarendon Press) (1978). In the Seventeenth Century, but
before the Statute of Monopolies was enacted, patents were issued as a way of alternative taxation
and rewarding loyal servants. Id. Patents involved the grant of a protected right in trade or
industry in exchange for a cash payment to the Crown. Id. Elevating patent application filing to
determinative status places the government in the position the framers feared.
152 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
15:3 Symposium, Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform of the PatentStandard: The Proper
Balance of Competition and PatentLaw and Policy: Executive Summary, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
861, 879 (2004) [hereinafter Ideas Into Action]. Patents used to be published only when they were
issued, while patent applications were never published. Id.
154 Id.
155 Reiko Watase, Note.* The American Inventors ProtectionAct of 1999.An Analysis of the
Now Eighteen-Month PublicationProvision,20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 649, 679 (2002).

[6:129 2006]

The Patent Reform Act's Proposed First-To-File Standard

Therefore, all patent applications, including those filed domestically, should be
published 156 in a free public database that is easily accessible to all. This would
allow all inventors, corporations, or individuals to access patent applications. An
inventor claiming priority can raise a claim at an earlier point before either party
spends considerable effort and resources developing the invention. 15 7 Potentially,
some disputes can be resolved before a patent is even issued. Also, the quality of any
resulting patent will be heightened because publication allows for added scrutiny.
Additionally, publishing patent applications improves certainty in patents that are
eventually granted and lessens expense. Of course, it is necessary to protect the
inventor from others copying the invention from the published application, which can
be accomplished by awarding the inventor damages for such an infringement if the
application results in a patent. 158 Immediate publication of patent applications also
serves to further encourage inventors to file quickly, without eliminating the rights of
the true inventor.
Second, once the application has been filed, steps should also be taken to further
streamline the process by which the patent is challenged. Any priority challenges
should be expedited through an administrative proceeding. These claims should be
reviewed quickly using arbitrators that are experienced in the field.
These
administrative proceedings should, in an expedited and streamlined fashion, develop
all factual matters. Appeals can be taken from these proceedings to an appellate
159
court, with limited jurisdiction to only hear priority of patent appeals.
Third, Congress could limit the time to apply for a patent and to shorten the life
of any patent not used to produce a product or service. For example, inventors might
be required to file patent applications within a short time after the original invention
date. Also, patents, once granted, might exist for only a few years from the date of
invention, unless there is a showing that the patent holder had actually used the
patent or licensed its use by others. Returning to the Constitutional standard of
promoting innovations that actually promote the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts" may lessen the uncertainty of the current system. This would encourage
subsequent inventors to bring new products and services to the marketplace with less
fear of unknown inventors or professional patent holders (commonly referred to as
"trolls") seeking advantage from inaction.
Taking advantage of technology and modern communication standards,
streamlining the interference process, and returning to Constitutional standards to
require patent usefulness may increase stability in the current standard. However,
1,5Ideas

Into Action, supra note 153 ("Hearing participants advocated expanding the 18-

month publication requirement to include patents filed only domestically, because such patents may
well have competitive significance.").
157 See Watase, supra note 155.
158 Ideas Into Action, supra note 153 (noting that when publication is required, "patent
applicants are protected from copying [of] their inventions by statutory royalty rights, if the patent
ultimately issues").
159 General Instrument Corp. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 995 F.2d 209, 211 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Section 146 of Title 35 provides that "any party to an interference dissatisfied
with the decision of the Board . . . may have remedy by civil action."
Consequently, such a party may timely file a complaint in an amenable federal
district court challenging the decision of the Board awarding priority to another.
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it is not the focus here to exhaustively list possible improvements in patent
procedures. Rather, it is suggested that Congress focus on procedural reform rather
than attempt a fundamental shift in the Constitutionally based patent law.

IV. CONCLUSION

Section 3 of H.R. 2795, which departs from over two hundred years of settled
patent law by adopting a first-to-file standard for patent dispute resolution, should
not be enacted because it is unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and
contrary to the fundamental concerns of the Framers in strictly limiting
monopolies. 160 The Patent Clause is both a grant and a limitation of Congressional
161
power, making this Clause unique from the other Article I, Section 8 powers.
Therefore, Congress can only act in accordance with the power it has been granted.
Despite few insights into the intended meaning of the term "Inventors,"
Congress and the courts have continued to interpret its meaning as the first inventor,
not the first person to file an application.1 62 The Patent Clause not only expresses its
purpose, but also the manner in which it should be implemented. 163 Therefore, the
term "Inventors" cannot be altered to effect change in the patent standard.
For over two hundred years, Congress and the courts have consistently
interpreted the principles required by the Patent Clause. 164 While there are current
pressures to adopt the first-to-file standard due to the efforts toward international
patent harmonization, this cannot be done at the expense of upholding the United
States Constitution.1 65 Such a change is not only contrary to the Constitutional
requirements, but also invites the abuses the Framers sought to prevent. The firstto-file standard denies original inventors their property rights simply because
someone else first filed a form in a government office. This is incompatible with the
principle that patent monopolies should only be granted to compensate inventors for
their innovation.

10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Patent Reform Act 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
161 Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
162 Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 318-19 (1833) (noting that the legislature, through the
various Patent Acts, intended to vest the exclusive patent right in the inventor only).
163 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
164 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Shaw, 32 U.S. at 318-19 (noting that the legislature, through
the various Patent Acts, intended to vest the exclusive patent right in the inventor only).
165 Fiorito, supra note 9, at 83, 88-89.

